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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
and TELLURIDE POWER COM-
PANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH and NEPHI CITY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
7803 
REPLY BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF 
TELLURIDE POWER COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
NEPHI MAKES MANY MISSTATEMENTS, 
EXAGGERATIONS AND HALF TRUTHS. 
On page 4 Nephi states that Telluride claims Nephi City 
as part of its territory. What Telluride claims is that it 
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serves retail all around Nephi and wholesale to Nephi. It 
does not retail electric energy in Nephi and never has. It 
doesn't claim the right to do so although the Public Service 
Commission could grant to Telluride a certificate to do so. 
Nephi on page 2 challenges Telluride's statement that 
Utah Power has never devoted any of its facilities to furn-
ishing power for distribution south of Mona. This is said 
· to be directly contrary to the evidence. This accusation is 
based not upon evidence but upon a legal theory that Utah 
Power Company dedicated itself to serve Nephi and other 
southern cities because it sells power to Telluride which in 
turn distributes to such places. As shown in Telluride's 
original brief the uncontradicted evidence is that Utah Power 
Company has no facilities for rendering service south of 
Mona (R. 110-113). 
There is a fundamental lack of understanding of the 
power business running through Nephi's brief. It assumes 
that the cost of transmission facilities is the only expense in-
volved in rendering service by an electric power company. 
It urges that since Nephi will build its own transmission 
line from Mona to Nephi that the Commission's order im-
poses no expense on Utah Power. But when a power com-
pany holds itself out as willing to serve, or is ordered to 
serve or offer to serve, a certain area with electric power, 
it assumes or has thrust upon it the obligation to have that 
power available which involves the greatest item of ex-
pense incident to rendering the service. If it is necessary 
in order to construct new generating facilities it must do 
so .. When the P.S.C. orders Utah Power Company to offer 
to sell electricity to Nephi City, there is a great deal more 
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involved than the mere words of offer. Utah Power Com-
pany must have the necessary power available and keep it 
available. It must fulfill the obligation to render that serv-
ice, although it has never professed to serve it. 
Nephi on pages 21 and 22 argues that even though Utah 
Power has not dedicated its property to rendering service 
to Nephi City, yet it should have no objection because Nephi 
is going to build its own transmission line and that there-
fore Utah Power & Light will merely be selling to Nephi the 
same power which it has been selling to Telluride. This 
statement is inconsistent with the record and disregards 
an elementary principle of electric power utility law. In 
the first place, it assumes that all power sold by Telluride 
to Nephi is purchased from the Utah Power, which, as 
shown under I, is not true. In the second place, it assumes 
incorrectly that the obligation which it would have to Nephi 
City would be the same as the obligation which it has to 
Telluride. They are entirely different. The obligation to 
Telluride is controlled by the contract between Telluride and 
Utah Power, Exhibit 8, (R. 258) which provides that Utah 
Power only has to furnish power to Telluride if it has an ex-
cess, and only to the extent of that excess. Of course under 
the Commission's order directing Utah Power to offer to ren-
der service to Nephi City, Utah Power would have to make 
good a full obligation to render service as an electric power 
utility. 
On pages 8 and 9 Nephi states that neither Telluride 
nor Utah Power could under any circumstances secure the 
right to distribute power in Nephi. The only truth in this 
is that Nephi could refuse a franchise to use its streets. 
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Otherwise P. S.C. could grant either one or both of them a 
certificate of convenience and necessity to sell power retail. 
Merely because a municipality is engaged in the power busi-
ness within its corporate limits does not mean that it is 
without the possibility of competition. As a matter of fact, 
Utah Power & Light Company continued to serve electric 
power in competition with Logan City for 8 years after the 
decision in the Logan City Power case in November, 1928. 
On page 3 Nephi states that Utah Power constructed 
the two transmission circuits to Mona for the express pur-
pose of selling large quantities of power to Telluride for 
distribution throughout Southern Utah. There is no such 
evidence. These lines are used to render service to the 
Thermoid Company Plant about two thousand feet north of 
Nephi and to deliver power purchased by Telluride (R. 99, 
100). They were not for the purpose of distributing power 
to Southern Utah. The power was sold by Utah Power to 
Telluride for whatever purposes Telluride desired to use it. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS DISCUSSED 
I. 
THE FACT THAT TELLURIDE BUYS POWER 
FROM UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY IS 
ENTIRELY IMMATERIAL. 
II. 
NEPHI CITY DID NOT SECEDE FROM UTAH 
BY GOING INTO THE ELECTRIC POWER 
BUSINESS IN 1903. THE STATE RETAINS 
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ALL SOVEREIGN POWERS EXCEPT THAT IT 
MAY NOT DELEGATE THE RIGHT TO REG-
ULATE NEPHI IN THE CONDUCT OF ITS 
ELECTRICAL POWER BUSINESS. 
III. 
NONE OF THE CASES CITED BY NEPHI 
HOLD THAT P. S. C. CAN SUBJECT TELLU-
RIDE TO THE HAZARDS OF COMPETITION 
UNLESS SERVICE IS UNSATISFACTORY. 
I. 
THE FACT THAT TELLURIDE BUYS POWER 
FROM UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY IS 
ENTIRELY IMMATERIAL. 
Throughout its brief Nephi lays much emphasis and 
bases many of its arguments upon the circumstance that 
Telluride purchases part of its power requirements from 
Utah Power. Analysis will demonstrate that the circum-
stance is entirely immaterial-just as immaterial as the 
circumstance that Nephi sells power to Telluride (R. 134). 
(a) All electric power sold by Telluride to Nephi City 
is the property of Telluride and Telluride is solely respons-
ible for its ava~iability and delivery. 
In the statement of facts and throughout the brief, 
Nephi City repeatedly states as a major premise to its 
arguments that the power distributed by Telluride to Nephi 
is fifty per cent from Utah Power. On page 17 Nephi makes 
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the extreme statement that even if the plaintiffs prevail, 
all of the power delivered by Telluride to Nephi is from 
Utah Power. There is no evidence in the record to sustain 
these reckless statements of Nephi. On the contrary, they 
are refuted by the uncontradicted evidence in the case. 
Exhibit 10 (R. 279) is a map of the Telluride Power system 
and shows its extent from Mona through Nephi, westerly to 
the Delta area and southerly to Richfield, Marysvale, Mil-
ford, Panguitch. 
The power generated by Telluride in four hydroelectric 
plants ( R. 188) constitutes about fifty per cent of what 
it distributes (R. 188, 209). The balance is purchased by it 
from interconnections. It interconnects with Nephi, Beaver, 
Manti, Ephraim, Mount Pleasant, Utah Power & Light, Big 
Springs Power Company, Gar-Kane Electric Association, 
and Southern Utah Power Company (R. 188). All of these 
companies buy and sell from each other (R. 188). Telluride 
buys from Utah Power (R. 189) and sells to Utah Power 
(R. 206). The Power Interchange Agreement is Exhibit 8 
(R. 258). Specifically, Telluride buys from each of the 
municipal plants above named and sells to each of the muni-
cipal plants named (R. 188). Specifically, Nephi sells power 
to Telluride (R. 134). Specifically, Telluride sells to South-
ern Utah Power Company (R. 207). 
Page 86 of the Telluride annual report for 1949, which 
was made part of the record (R. 198) shows that in 1949 
Telluride bought and sold from and to Nephi, Southern Utah 
Power Company, Manti City, Big Springs Power Company, 
Beaver City, Mount Pleasant and Ephraim City. 
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There are certain insinuations in the record and in 
the Nephi brief that there is something inefficient about 
Telluride buying power from other companies. No more 
hydroelectric power is available in the area (R. 216). It is 
therefore the duty of Telluride to secure power in order to 
meet its obligations as a public service company either by 
steam plants or by purchasing from others, whichever is 
cheaper (R. 200). It is a well recognized principle of the 
electric power industry that a steam plant is economical only 
if there is a big enough demand for the power and that in 
any area such as the Telluride area it would be uneconomical 
and wasteful (R. 166). For Telluride to manufacture electric 
power in a steam plant at greater expense than it could be 
purchased from others would, of course, be a violation of 
its duty as a public utility. 
Logan City v. Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company, 77 Utah 442, 296 Pac. 
1006. 
Accordingly, Telluride has entered into this pooling 
arrangement in which any of the participants requiring more 
power can secure it and any of them having excess power 
can sell it. It is an efficient and economical way of con-
ducting the business. It is freely admitted that Telluride has 
plenty of power at all times to fulfill its obligation to render 
service (R. 231). 
So also Utah Power & Light interconnects at the south 
with Telluride and at the north with Idaho power and Mon-
tana power (R. 115). Those companies in turn intercon-
nect with Oregon and Washington power companies. The 
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result is that Utah power may be used as far in the north-
west as Washington and Washington power may be used as 
far southeast as Utah, Nephi, Richfield, Marysvale and 
Panguitch. 
Title to the power purchased and sold passes at the 
point of delivery (R. 218). As between Telluride and Utah 
Power & Light this is at Mona, as stated by Nephi City in 
its brief. The responsibility of Utah Power & Light Company 
ceases at that point and that of the Telluride Company 
commences. All of the power sold by Telluride to anyone is 
Telluride power. At times it consists exclusively of power 
manufactured by Telluride (R. 217). At times that power is 
mixed with power from the municipalities (R. 188). Tellu-
ride does not resort to Utah Power until it has exhausted the 
excess power of the municipalities because the rate is higher. 
All of the power manufactured or drawn into its system by 
Telluride form its system-wide pool (R. 207). None of the 
power is earmarked. All of it has lost its identity. It is all 
Telluride power from the instant of delivery. 
(b) The fact that Utah Power sells power to Tellu-
ride for resale does not constitute a dedication by Utah 
Power of its property to serve areas where that power may 
be resold. 
On page 2 and elsewhere in Nephi's brief it is argued 
that Utah Power has devoted its facilities to furnishing 
power south of Mona. This is contrary to the uncontradicted 
evidence in the case (R. 101, 110-113, 119). It is based upon 
an erroneous legal theory that when Utah Power sells power 
to Telluride, and Telluride sells power to Nephi, that Utah 
Power has thereby dedicated its property to serve Nephi. 
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The argument carries Nephi City much too far. If that 
is true of Nephi City, it would also be true of Milford, Marys-
vale, Delta, Panguitch, Cedar City, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, 
Washington. It would mean that Utah Power could be com-
pelled by the Commission, as it was compelled in the case 
at bar, to render service to people in Kanab, Cedar City, 
Panguitch, etc. etc.; and that Southern Utah Power would 
have to render service to Salt Lake. 
II. 
NEPHI CITY DID NOT SECEDE FROM UTAH 
BY GOING INTO THE ELECTRIC POWER 
BUSINESS IN 1903. THE STATE RETAINS 
ALL SOVEREIGN POWERS EXCEPT THAT IT 
MAY NOT DELEGATE THE RIGHT TO REG-
ULATE NEPHI IN THE CONDUCT OF ITS 
ELECTRICAL POWER BUSINESS. 
On page 4 Nephi states that Telluride is trying to get 
the court to believe that the contract with Nephi converted 
Nephi into Telluride territory. No reliance is placed by 
Telluride on that contract. It is like any other contract 
made by a public utility corporation. The reliance is upon 
the dedication of its property by Telluride to the area in-
cluding Nephi, of furnishing power for retail and for resale. 
On page 8, Nephi states that P. S.C. has no jurisdiction 
to compel Nephi to purchase power from Telluride. It 
seems to forget that this action was brought by Nephi to 
secure an order from the Commission requiring Utah Power 
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to sell electricity to Nephi. In other words, Nephi has in-
voked the jurisdiction of the Commission, conceding not 
only that the Commission has jurisdiction but that the 
Commission can say "Yes" or "No" and can exercise a 
proper discretion. 
Nephi City makes the argument that the Nephi City 
area is withdrawn from all regulation the same as if it 
had been transplanted to another state. A moment's re-
flection rejects such an extreme statement. Merely because 
Logan City went into the power business and was not sub-
ject to regulation, as decided by this court, did not oust the 
Utah Power & Light Company from its business of-retail-
ing electricity in Logan. It carried on that business for 8 
years after the Supreme Court decision. It discontinued the 
retail service only after it became convinced that it could 
not compete with the city, which charged rates so low as 
to cause a deficit, which was made up by taxes. If the 
Utah Power & Light Company had had similar power of 
taxation it would probably be operating there still. 
On page 5, et seq., Nephi cites the constitution and 
quotes lengthily from Logan City v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion as if Telluride were contending contrary to the decision 
of the Supreme Court of Utah in the Logan Power case. 
Of course Telluride recognizes the full force of that case. 
Telluride understands thoroughly that Nephi is not subject 
to regulation by the Commission with respect to its electric 
power business. Telluride understands that the Commis-
sion cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly. This 
was all conceded at the trial. But inasmuch as Nephi is 
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seeking to have the P. S. C. exercise its discretion to re-
quire Utah Power to sell power to Nephi, according to the 
words of Nephi's own counsel (R. 313), Nephi must submit 
and indeed has submitted to the jurisdiction of the P. S. C. 
Nephi must not only appeal to the jurisdiction of 
P. S. C. to permit it to secure power from Utah Power, 
but in many other ways it must comply with the Public 
Utilities Law. If Nephi City ships freight for its electric 
power plant by rails or trucks from Salt Lake City it must 
pay the freight rate established by the schedules filed with 
and approved by the Public Service Commission. It cannot 
make a separate contract for a lesser rate. 
If Nephi has need of supplies to be brought from Salt 
Lake City and desires them carried by a common carrier 
it must deal with the common carrier having a certificate 
of convenience and necessity to move freight from Salt 
Lake City to Nephi. Nephi cannot make a special contract 
with a common carrier, say, who operates between Salt 
Lake City and Price, Utah. 
Nephi has not seceded from Utah. It is subject to the 
police power of the state in all particulars. 
In Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. (2d) 530, 
our court upheld the constitutionality of the Metropolitan 
Water District Act in spite of Article VI, Section 29 of 
the Constitution. On page 535 the court said: 
"It is contended the act is unconstitutional as 
an attempt to unlawfully delegate the power of tax-
ation to a special commission and to interfere in 
city and town affairs in violation of the provisions 
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of article VI, § 29, which reads as follows: 'The 
Legislature shall not delegate to any special com-
mission, private corporation or association, any 
power to make, supervise or interfere with any 
municipal improvement, money, property or effects, 
whether held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to 
select a capitol site, or to perform any municipal 
functions.' 
"* * * The power of control vested in the 
board of directors is over the property, improve-
ments, money, and effects of the district, and not 
that of any of the cities or towns whose territorial 
boundaries may be coincidental with that of the dis-
trict or included therein. The powers of the board 
are limited by the act to the levying of taxes for 
the public purposes mentioned therein. 
"None of the municipal functions of the com-
ponent cities or towns is conferred on or delegated 
to the Metropolitan Water District. Each of such 
cities and towns will possess and may continue to 
exercise every municipal function it now has. There 
need be no friction between the two, but the closest 
cooperation is contemplated and should result." 
Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 
183, 51 P. (2d) 645. The Liquor Control Act authorized the 
State Liquor Commission to regulate the sale of alcoholic 
beverages within municipalities. It was contended that this 
offended Article 6, Section 29. The court held it did not. 
On page 656 the court said : 
"* * * The state's authority to regulate and 
control the sale of light beer becomes a municipal 
function when, and only when, the state divests it-
self and invests a municipality with such powers. 
A municipality acquired such authority, if at all, by 
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an act of the Legislature. No such power is con-
ferred upon counties, cities, or towns within the 
state by the Constitution. The state having, as it 
does, plenary power to either grant to or withhold 
from municipalities the right to control the manufac-
ture, sale, and use of intoxicating liquors, it follows 
that the state may confer limited authority upon 
municipalities and retain to itself all control not so 
granted. * * *" 
Provo City v. Department of Business Regulation, 218 
P. (2d) 675. The Public Service Commission made an order 
that public convenience and necessity did not require the 
opening of Ninth South Street across the yards of the Rio 
Grande in Provo. It was contended by Provo City that 
Article 6, Section 29, prohibited the Commission from in 
any way affecting the public roads in Provo. On page 678 
the court said : 
"Article VI, Section 29, of the Constitution of 
this State, which is the Section relied upon by the 
city, restricts the legislature from delegating power 
to commissions to interfere with local self-govern-
ment of cities. * * * 
* * * * * 
"From the proVIsiOns of this section it is ap-
parent that the framers of the constitution intended 
that control over railroads operating within this 
state should rest with the legislative department of 
the state. Such an intent is consistent with the na-
ture of the operations and problems of railroads. 
For the most part, their activities are the concern 
of the general public rather than of the individual 
communities they serve. 
"Under the constitutional provision quoted 
above, the legislature has, in turn, delegated certain 
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powers to the cities and other powers to the com-
mission. * * *" 
In considering the Logan City case, it must be borne 
in mind that the Utah Power & Light Company was not 
required by the decision in the Supreme Court to discon-
tinue the rendition of electric energy public service in 
Logan. The court held only that the Commission did not 
have jurisdiction to regulate the rates of Logan City. 
Utah Power continued to operate in Logan for 8 years 
after November, 1928, the date of the Logan Power decision, 
until it learned that it could not compete for business in 
Logan because Logan fixed its rates so low that they were 
noncompensatory and in fact lost money which was made 
good from the payment of taxes. But so far as the law was 
concerned the Utah Power & Light Company had the right 
to continue to render service in Logan and it did so for 8 
years. 
Nephi argues from the case of Mackay Light & Powe·r 
Company v. Ashton & St. Anthony Power Company, that 
Nephi, by serving the public with electric power, removed 
its territory from the control of the P. S. C. as completely 
and effectively as if such territory had been bodily taken 
and moved into some other state. If so, why did Nephi 
invoke the jurisdiction of the P. S. C. in this very case. 
Nephi's argument and the order of the Commission 
are based upon this misconception of the law. Nephi did 
not secede from Utah in 1903 by going into the electric 
power business. The only effect was that it is not subject 
-to regulation by the Public Service Commission as to the 
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conduct of that particular business. In all other particu-
lars Nephi is subject to regulation like all other municipal-
ities. If Nephi purchases power from a company regulated 
by the P. S. C. it must comply with the regulations of the 
P. S.C. 
Nephi City has admitted this throughout the case. 
At R. 313, Nephi City made the following statement: 
"It (the municipality) can purchase its power 
anywhere it is available, except that it must get the 
approval of the P. S. C. if it attempts to purchase 
from a regulated utility." 
Again, Nephi City said at R. 313: 
"The only restriction on the purchase of power 
by Nephi that the P. S. C. or anyone else can place 
is that if it purchases power from a regulated utility 
the P. S. C. must approve." 
Again at R. 313, Nephi City said: 
"This regulation of the P. S. C. in the case of a 
purchase of power from a regulated utility has 
nothing to do with city boundaries. That permission 
would be necessary even if the regulated utility were 
generating power within the city. It is equally true 
if it were generating power outside the city. The 
important thing is that it is a regulated utility and 
not where it is located." 
The acts of Nephi City speak even louder than its words . 
Nephi City filed this application with the Public Service 
Commission and thus appealed to its jurisdiction and dis-
cretion. If Nephi City had had the absolute right to buy 
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16 
power from the Utah Power & Light Company, as stated by 
the Commission, (R. 47) no petition to the Public Service 
Commission need have been made. It would only have been 
necessary to bring an action to compel Utah Power & Light 
Company to perform its clear legal duty. 
III. 
NONE OF THE CASES CITED BY NEPHI 
HOLD THAT P. S. C. CAN SUBJECT TELLU-
RIDE TO THE HAZARDS OF COMPETITION 
UNLESS SERVICE IS UNSATISFACTORY. 
Nephi relies most strongly on two cases, Union Electric 
Company of Missouri on pages 9, 18 and 24, and Mackay 
Light & Power Company v. Ashton & St. Anthony Power 
Company on pages 11-14. Neither case supports Nephi's 
contention. 
The following fundamental and elementary differences 
in the facts of the Missouri case make it inapplicable: 
1. At page 431 the Commission says that the 
evidence showed that the Sho-Me east line could not 
be relied upon for maintaining proper voltage and 
that evidence was introduced to show dissatisfaction 
of the city and its residents with the service re-
ceived. In the Telluride case no dissatisfaction was 
shown or suggested. 
2. In the Missouri case neither utility possessed 
a certificate of convenience and necessity to render 
any service within the City of Rolla or its immediate 
vicinity. See page 432. Telluride, on the other hand, 
.does possess a certificate of convenience and neces-
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.,. sity to sell power wholesale to Nephi and also to 
": serve retail outside the city limits of Nephi. 
~:: 3. On page 433 the Missouri Commission stated 
t.: that it could not be said that the City of Rolla was 
within the allotted service area of either the Sho-
Me or the Union. In the Telluride case the area in 
question is within the allotted service area of Tellu-
ride and not Utah Power & Light Company. 
--· 
.. ~ 
4. In the Missouri case the utility correspond-
ing to Utah Power & Light Company was the ap-
plicant for a certificate authorizing it to render ser-
vice to the municipality. Utah Power & Light Com-
pany, on the contrary, is resisting the effort of 
Nephi City. 
On pages 11-14 defendant relies heavily on Mackay L. 
& P. Co. v. Ashton & St. Anthony Power Company, ve-
hemently stating that it involved the "identical problem" 
and that it "perfectly parallels" the case at bar, and that 
the Idaho Commission confirmed the right of the village 
of Arco to bypass the Mackay Company to acquire power 
from the Ashton Company. We commend this case to the 
careful reading of the court. Nephi not only misstates the 
facts but misstates the decision of the Commission. The 
actual holding of the case was that the Commission disap-
proved a proposed contract between Arco and the Ashton 
Company for the construction of transmission lines so that 
power of the Ashton Company could be used by Arco. See 
page 12. 
The Mackay Company was granted a certificate of 
:;;. convenience and necessity by the Commission on June 13, 
-' 1919 (see page 8). 
--· 
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The Ashton Company had been granted a certificate 
of convenience and necessity on February 11, 1915, to op-
erate in a certain territory which included the point to 
which Ashton proposed to construct a transmission line 
to connect with a transmission line to be constructed by 
Arco. The contract covering this proposed transaction was 
the one under discussion in the case. The town of Arco 
was not even a party to the action. 
The language quoted by defendant on pages 12 to 1 ·4 
of its brief was pure dictum. The Commission was of the 
opinion that the Ashton Company, which was subject to 
regulation, was hiding behind the village of Arco, which 
was not subject to regulation, to do something that it would 
not otherwise have the right to do. The contract was there-
fore condemned. On page 11 the Commission said: 
"The Ashton & St. Anthony Power Company, 
being a utility under the control of the Commission, 
will not be permitted to invade the territory of a 
rival utility by hiding behind the law exempting 
municipal corporations from the jurisdiction of the 
Commission. Some of the provisions of the contract 
between said defendant Ashton & St. Anthony Power 
Company and the village of Arco, introduced as an 
exhibit in this case, indicate that said defendant 
is attempting, by means of said contract, to acquire 
for itself some advantage other than serving the 
village of Arco, in the territory covered by the cer-
tificate of complainant. Also the wording of said 
contract indicates that said village of Arco contem-
plates the securing, under said contract, of electric 
energy in excess of its needs for use within the 
municipality, and that it proposes to sell and dis-
tribute such excess in territory adjacent to, and 
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outside of, the village limits under the provisions 
of § 3971, Idaho Compiled Statutes. 
"The Commission does not approve such con-
tract, and will not approve any provision by which 
the village of Arco gives or attempts to give to said 
defendant, Ashton & St. Anthony Power Company, 
any right to own or operate any electric transmis-
sion line or equipment, or any interest therein, or 
any exclusive right to purchase same, or any inter-
est therein, or any advantage at all, in territory 
covered by the certificate of complainant herein 
outside the corporate limits of said village of 
Arco, unless it is expressly predicated upon the 
securing of a certificate of convenience and neces-
sity from the Commission by said defendant, Ashton 
& St. Anthony Power Company, authorizing it to 
enter said territory." 
Thus it is evident that defendant's statement that this 
case confirmed the right of Arco to bypass the Mackay 
Company and acquire property from the Ashton Company 
is incorrect. On the contra1.·y, the Commission refused to 
approve such contract. 
On pages 14-15, Nephi cites Town of Kearney v. Passaic 
Consolidated Water Company and Village District of Bel-
mont v. La Gonia Gas & Electric Company. Neither case is 
in point. 
In the Kearney case the supply of water served by the 
New Jersey Suburban Water Company was inadequate to 
the needs of the Town of Kearney. In the case now before 
the Utah Public Service Commission, no one claims that 
Telluride cannot serve all the needs of Nephi City. 
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In the Belmont case, both the La Coni a Gas & Electric 
Company and the Tilton Electric Light & Power Company 
had certificates to serve the Town of Belmont. Tilton had 
been serving for several years and Belmont desired to change 
and purchase from the La Conia Power Company. The New 
Hampshire Public Service Commission permitted a change 
and said: 
"The La Conia Company has general authority 
to operate as a public utility in the Town of Belmont. 
Since it has this privilege the law imposes upon it the 
duty to serve, upon reasonable terms, anyone in Bel-
mont desiring service." 
In the case at bar Utah Power & Light Company has no 
operating authority to serve south of Mona, whereas in the 
New Hampshire case the La Conia Power had general auth-
ority to serve in the area of the Town of Belmont. 
On pages 17 and 19, Nephi cites the case of North Salt 
Lake v. St. Joseph Water' & Irrigation Company. Plaintiff 
is unable to understand what pertinency this case has. It 
merely holds that the Public Service Commission has juris-
diction over the number of connections made by a water 
company. 
On page 18 Nephi cites the cases of Alabama Power Co. 
v. Guntersville, from Alabama. The case merely holds that 
an electric power utility corporation established in a city 
does not have a constitutional right of monopoly and that 
the municipality may enter the electric power business. The 
case is the same as the Logan City Power case and recognizes 
the right of Alabama Power Company to continue in busi-
ness in competition with the municipality. 
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On page 18 Nephi cites the case of People v. Loveland, 
from Colorado. This case merely holds that under the Colo-
rado constitution a city has the right to go into the electric 
power business. 
In summary, Nephi has not cited a single case wherein 
a Public Service Commission has permitted a utility serving 
a neighboring area under a certificate limiting its service 
to that area to invade, directly or indirectly, the area ade-
quately served by a neighboring utility, also operating under 
a limited geographical certificate. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission's order 
should be set aside as illegal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. R. WALDO, 
W. Q. VAN COTT, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
Telluride Power Company. 
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